

Capítulo 5:

**Economic Impact of Indian Immigration and Commercial Capital on the Formation of a Colonial Labor Force. The Case of Buenos Aires in the Early Seventeenth Century**

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For most of the historians, rural salaries and debt peonage in frontier regions stem from the chronic scarcity of manpower and the consequent need to attract labor. In the inter-war era, at a time when economic history removed legal and political history from the academic arena, the role played by economic networks were underlined. In those times, for both Juan Alvarez and Ricardo Levene, left wing liberals writing about the Rio de la Plata region in particular, the issue at stake could not be limited to determining the legal ways in which salary relations were organized (voluntary or by force, collectively or individually, in money or in kind) but rather must have been centered on the combination of the productive factors (land, labor, and capital). While Juan Alvarez argued from an economic point of view, that because of the land-intensive and labor-saving nature of cattle raising, or in other words, its low land-labor marginal rate of substitution, it existed in the Buenos Aires countryside more manpower supply than was strictly necessary, or that internal migration was irrelevant, Ricardo Levene argued that because of the labor-intensive and land-saving nature of agriculture, or in other words, its high land-labor marginal rate of substitution, Buenos Aires traditionally experienced a chronic scarcity of manpower, or an endless need of an intensive internal migration.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, for Sergio Bagú, an Argentine historian writing from a leftist point of view about Latin America in general, and presumably borrowing his thesis from José Carlos Mariátegui, the Indian wage was from its very beginning a bastardized type of salary, a dissembling form of slavery, unable to freely attract labor unless it was expelled from its place of origin.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, for Branislava Susnik, a liberal ethnologist writing about colonial Paraguay, Indians who were rented out by their encomenderos to frontier regions were expelled or, in other words, engaged in a sort of forced migration.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, for Ignacio del Río, a Mexican historian writing about the north of New Spain, the appearance of Indian wage-labor could not have showed up in that marginal region until their native Indians, induced by missionaries, abandoned nomadism, or otherwise, a new type of sedentary Indians be attracted by the northern region from the central areas by means of the salary system.<sup>4</sup>

Indian *conciertos* (wage contracts) represented for the left-wing liberal school of thought the institutional remnants of what might be called the 'Renaissance reformers' who, under the influence of Thomas More, Erasmus, and Bartolomé de las Casas, thought that by prohibiting Indian enslavement, abolishing *encomiendas*, and confining Indians to towns where they would work for wages rather than sharecropping or serving on a personal basis, and forbidding Spaniards from penetrating into new territories without being duly licensed, Indians could begin to behave as European consumers. However, the depression period that began with the crisis of 1640 removed Indian wage contracts from the productive social relations of the period, returning Indians to personal service and sharecropping. In going so far in its social legislation, the Spanish crown felt, at the same time, that it was responsible for supplying incentives and encouragement for colonization. The exploitation of Indians, with the simple elements of suitable European technology in their hands, only guaranteed high profits if there existed

the possibility of forcing them to work and paying them very little. For Eric Wolf, this Indian manpower, despite of being formally under salary relations, still does not show the characteristics of a proletariat.<sup>5</sup> For Eric Van Young, Magnus Mörner, and Arnold Bauer, wage labor was the last stage of a long lineal progression of *encomienda* to *repartimiento* to wage labor, as well as a 'response to the shrinkage of the labor pool that is ultimately assignable to Indian demographic collapse'.<sup>6</sup> Finally, for Severo Martínez Peláez, salary in the colonial period differed from the capitalist salary, because a development of the productive forces was not present nor could be artificially created in the evolving colonies.<sup>7</sup>

On the contrary, left-wing liberals discovered in the midst of the twentieth century, at a time when economic history still held the hegemony and social history was just coming to light, that the Spanish colonialism (Spanish crown and bureaucracy) did their best to articulate the Indian native society with the colonial culture, to separate the *encomendado* Indians from their means of production as well as from *encomendero* rule, and to attempt to implant the free labor or wage system in its colonies. Furthermore, in those times, for many historians the issue at stake could not be limited to determining the combination of articulations (domestic service, mills, and factories) through which the native was put into contact with capitalist or with neo-feudal culture, but rather must have been centered on the profit-oriented strategies of the *encomendero* rank. For Alvaro Jara, a Chilean historian, writing about the central valley of Chile, a peripheral region of the Peruvian core, the Indian wage was the result of renting out *encomendado* Indians to non-*encomendero* entrepreneurs. The revenue obtained by the *encomenderos* as a consequence of these transactions was almost double the amount of tribute that those Indians or their employers were supposed to pay, taking into consideration that one fourth of that revenue had to be deducted in order to pay salaries.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, for Murdo Mac Leod, a liberal American historian, writing about Spanish Central America, the efforts of *encomenderos* to force Indians to return to their villages had little effect as long as the non-*encomendero* employers pay the tribute.<sup>9</sup> Finally, according to Ignacio del Río, the Mexican historian writing about the north of New Spain, an immediate benefit for those sedentary Mexican Indians brought from the south, unlike those Chilean Indians described by Alvaro Jara, was in discarding tributary obligations.<sup>10</sup>

In the post-war era, at a time when social history removed economic history from the academic environment, the role played by social and ethnic networks were emphasized. In those times, for Antonio García, a left-wing nationalist writing about Latin America in general and Colombia in particular, the issue at stake could not be limited to determining the ways in which productive factors were organized but rather must have been centered on the combinations of articulations (domestic service, public works projects, mills, and factories) through which the native was put into contact with capitalist or with neo-feudal culture.<sup>11</sup> In other words, for left-wing nationalists the threat imposed by royal officials on the *encomendero* class, consisting in emancipating the Indians from the *encomendero* rule through the salary system as well as in increasing the benefits for the non-*encomenderos* in order for them to be able to hire sedentary Indians, could have been avoided successfully only by means of an alliance between the colonial landowning aristocracy and a dependent mercantile bourgeoisie.

On the contrary, for members of the new left school of thought, 'free' Indian wages meant capitalist relations of distribution. This last interpretation resulted from a point of view that considered Indian wages as a crucial element that encouraged the profitability of colonial enterprises, caused an intense internal migration, and backed the growth of the western capitalist economy.<sup>12</sup> Reinforcing this argument, for liberal revisionists like Charles Gibson, Cristobal Kay, Friedrich Katz, and Arnold Bauer Indian demands of high cash advances (debt-peonage arrangements) as a condition for their labor was not, as propounded by Silvio Zavala and Francois Chevalier, an indication of bondage but, on the contrary, it testified the landowners' lack of extra-economic power as well as the bargaining power of the Indians.<sup>13</sup> In the Rio de la Plata region, even high wages did not prevent the Pampas' nomadic Indians from running away. All these were reasons why the monarchy felt obliged to increase the benefits for

the non-encomenderos in order for them to be able to hire sedentary Indians from the encomenderos of the interior provinces.

Finally, left structuralists underrated the importance of the antagonism between the royal bureaucracy and the encomenderos as well as the means by which the former pretended to defeat the latter, and emphasized as the main contradiction of the transition from feudalism to capitalism the struggle of a colonial mercantile bourgeoisie against a colonial encomendero aristocracy. In believing so, the new left considered the colonial mercantile bourgeoisie as an ally of the Crown, the forced Indian migration as the natural demand of a new expanded scale of the agrarian mercantile production, and the Indian wage as a necessary income in order to pay the royal tribute, which was forced on the Indians by the mandatory monetization of the encomienda rent. However, they did not consider Indian wages to be neither a feudal income nor a capitalist salary. The wages paid to the worker were not the equivalent of the necessary work of the contracted Indian and did not cover the whole reproduction of the labor power. Non-encomendero employers, besides exploiting the labor of the wage earner, also exploited the labor of his kin group. Thus, for left-wing structuralists, salary fluctuations did not correspond to the ups and downs of a free labor market, and consequently, was not an indication of the bargaining power of the Indians.<sup>14</sup>

However, none of the historians who wrote about the Indians in Latin America, with exception of Antonio García, were concerned with the alliance between encomenderos, merchants, and landowners, to help the formation of a colonial labor force and the articulation of a colonial entrepot with its own hinterland. The Indian migration in the early seventeenth century is probably most important to understanding the process of formation of the creoles working class in Argentina, for it was responsible for setting the most relevant precedent for the immigration of oppressed minorities (marginal population) in the late nineteenth century.<sup>15</sup> In light of this historiographical deficit and in order to reconsider the economic impact of commercial capital on the encomienda system, I am going to analyze how the penetration of commercial capital helped the decomposition of encomiendas from the interior provinces, as well as the subsequent migration of a relative overpopulation to Buenos Aires. This analysis will be realized by studying the social relations of production prevailing in Buenos Aires: salary incentives, debt peonage, salary in kind, and sharecropping. Moreover, this study will be done by using the identification of the Indian's location of origin, and the distribution of Indian labor among encomiendas of origin and among contractors.

The Buenos Aires' Pampa was considered during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and the first half of the nineteenth centuries as a frontier region, and as such their Indian settlers, according to the Laws of the Indies, were freed from tributary obligations and personal service. Just as the forced Pampa's manpower was scarce and uncertain, and so was the labor force that these Indians were willing to contribute voluntarily. Thus, the labor that the Pampa's Indians did not provide had to be brought from the northern provinces. But, as the task to channel those Indians from the north to the south could not be done by means of the repartimiento because of the damage it would have inflicted on the northern encomenderos, the ruling elite finally resorted to the salary system.

This articulation of the Buenos Aires hinterland, the decomposition of Indian villages, and the emancipation of the encomendado Indians from their means of production as well as from the encomendero rule, was related to the original location from whence surplus Indian labor had been extracted. The violent dynamic imposed by the Spaniard conquest generated new economic structures among which the agro-exporting economy stood out (cattle-hunting and ranching). The latter reverberated drastically on the indigenous structures of the interior provinces absorbing a relevant portion of the existent surplus labor. But when an agro-exporting economy such as the one of Córdoba's province capitulated (1606) its labor had no other choice than to run away.

The separation of Córdoba's Indians from their means of production was intimately related with the enactment of the Real Cédula de Ampudia in 1606. By destroying Córdoba's flour industry the Crown indirectly expelled forced surplus labor to Buenos Aires. The growth of slavery expanded the labor forces available to several non-encomendero entrepreneurs, but did not alleviate the need for extra labor. To increase the labor force during the harvest time, a non-encomendero colonial entrepreneur in Buenos Aires often hired Indians for short time periods. Similarly, a growing sector of encomenderos from the interior provinces had no alternative but to rent out their Indians in order to meet their desperate need for cash. By the same token, a growing sector of Buenos Aires non-encomendero entrepreneurs without access to encomienda Indians had no alternative but to offer wages to Indians and high rent to encomenderos in order to encourage Indians to work for them. Non-encomendero entrepreneurs preferred to use Indians rather than slaves, thus encouraging the articulation of Buenos Aires with its own hinterland. When the type of rural production was essentially land-intensive: as was the case of cattle raising, landowners found it more profitable first to encourage the hiring of more wage Indians, and second to discourage the purchase of slaves. The land-intensive nature of cattle-raising, or in other words, its high wage-slave marginal rate of substitution, pushed landowners to expand their cattle interests by essentially hiring wage Indians.

According to this labor strategy, Indian manpower became profitable as long as slaves remained too expensive. As long as the price of slaves remained high, the capital that landowners had to spend monthly in order to hire Indians became almost irrelevant. Indian labor did not signify a monetary outlay that could be entirely lost if the worker ran away or became ill and died. The replacement of Indian labor with new Indians cost non-encomendero entrepreneurs far less than a slave. For instance, as a result of military troops arriving from Tucuman, Santa Fé or Corrientes to defend Buenos Aires against foreign threats (1594, 1616, 1625 and 1645) a large supply of Indian manpower was provided once the threat was over.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the majority of encomendado Indians hired in Buenos Aires originated from the interior provinces. In the interior provinces the encomenderos developed an agrarian structure characterized by the peasant mode of production, indirect exploitation by power-brokers (mayordomos de encomienda or pobleros, doctrinero priests, merchants, etc.), and corporate peasant communities displaying some strength and closure.<sup>17</sup> Before commercial capital succeeded in penetrating the interior provinces the almost feudal structure prevailing in the area prevented the development of long-distance commerce and transportation. This situation existed because the encomenderos denied or restrained the flow of Indian manpower, by tying Indians to the encomienda and the obraje, and by making this manpower supply dependent on the encomendero's authorization and on a rent payment. It is necessary to remind that the encomendero ruled his jurisdiction with an authority far more absolute than that enjoyed by the viceroy or governor over the whole viceroyalty or governorship. He was the judge, the police chief, the jailer, the tax collector, and he even chose the clergymen in the church. The political power concentrated in the hands of the encomendero enabled him to extract a tribute (absolute rent) from the Indians within his domain, either in the form of labor, monetary payments, or in kind. After commercial capital succeeded in penetrating the interior provinces the encomenderos exchanged periodically their Indians for silver from Upper Peru and an equivalent income in European merchandise from Buenos Aires. With few exceptions, each of the notarial wage contracts (of each Indian hired) in Buenos Aires reveals the location of origin. We know out of that information that 97% of the Indian population hired in Buenos Aires on a wage basis came from the interior (55% from the north; 30% from the litoral; and 15% from the west). Only 3% of the Indians hired were from Buenos Aires itself.<sup>18</sup> (see Table 1). My dissertation shows us an alphabetic list of the Buenos Aires encomenderos who hired out those Indians on a wage basis.<sup>19</sup> If by exchanging their Indians for European merchandise, the encomenderos accomplished the separation of those Indians from their means of production, we can conclude that both encomenderos, long-distance merchants, and landowners, have sealed an alliance, whereby long-distance merchants held the hegemony, subordinating Indian wages to the command of the commercial rate of interest. Wages in a period of transition from feudalism to capitalism were neither a feudal income, as postulated by the

liberal left, nor were they a capitalist income, as propounded by the new left, but an intermediate type of income, ruled by the interest rate on commercial capital.

Indians from the interior provinces working for a salary in Buenos Aires were essentially Indians who were rented out to non-encomenderos for a revenue more than double the amount of tribute that those Indians were supposed to pay.<sup>20</sup> The fact that Indians coming from the interior were hired under contracts where the name of the encomendero and the province of origin were detailed, convinces me of the tributary nature of most of those Indians. Furthermore, the fact that very seldom did contracts mention the characterization of yanacona Indians or the specific circumstance that the Indian was "free from tribute" confirms the tributary nature of most of those Indians. Thus, the non-encomendero who hired those Indians was obliged to pay the rent, including the Indian tribute to the encomendero, and the salary to the Indian. Therefore, Indians were to live where they wished as long as they paid the tribute. The efforts of encomenderos to force Indians to return to their communities had little effect as long as their new masters, the non-encomendero employers, paid the tribute.

The term yanacona, which at first was applied to Peruvian and Chilean Indians, was used in Buenos Aires to describe a minority of "free Indians", or Indians who no longer owed allegiance to any encomendero and had entered, through wage contracts, the service of a Spanish or creole master.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, the encomendado Indians were not yanaconas but a special type of wage earner. In effect, the concertaje (formal wage labor contract) was a collective contract between the corregidor, a politically appointed authority in charge of obliging local Indians to perform the concierto (contract) and the non-encomendero employer who paid a stipulated salary through the royal administration. Wages of those Indians who belonged to local encomiendas were paid to the Cajas de Comunidad (community cashier's office), controlled by the corregidor, serving, although not always, as a fund that contributed to covering the tribute of the Indian town as well as the maintenance of the kin group.<sup>22</sup> But Corregidores did not always perform their duties. In 1652, for instance, the Cabildo of Buenos Aires requested the corregidor not to convert the Cajas de Comunidad into private pools of capital.<sup>23</sup>

In our preliminary research on the indexes of the notarial records we have located a total of 1,046 labor contracts registered between 1608 and 1654. Out of this total figure we have been able to find in the notarial books, thanks to a more detailed research, only 1026 labor contracts encompassing 1098 Indians. In the period before 1642 the research embraced 927 contracts encompassing 967 Indians. Out of them we have located the geographic origin of only 681 Indians. Moreover, from this total number of Indians we have discovered 48 Indians who renewed their contracts twice, two Indians who have done it three times, and one Indian who had renewed his contract four times. In other words, the number of Indians hired with a well known geographic origin get reduced in half a hundred, reaching a total of 919 Indians. The procedure followed to identify the renewed presence of Indian peasants and cart laborers in the Buenos Aires labor market have been in some ways aleatory. The main difficulty for their identification lied in the fact that Indians, like Black slaves, did not carry last names. The latter were repalced with the names of the encomenderos to whom each Indian belonged. In our research we started with the methodological assumption that two Indians from the same geographical origin, coming from the same encomienda, who carried the same first name, and who hired in consecutive years, with equivalent wages, by the same contractor, were necessarily the same person.

The presence of farm, transportation, and artisan Indian labor on a peripheral entrepot economy like that of Buenos Aires, generated among farmers, cart-owners, and master artisans, a widespread competition for labor resources. Although artisan wage earners were easily identifiable, farm and transportation wage earners were hard to distinguish. There are two methods available for distinguishing those Indian wage earners engaged in the transportation service from those engaged in agrarian jobs. The most easy way to find a contract where the Indian hired served in the transportation

service was through the extension of the term period. Almost all of those Indians hired by month were engaged in the cart business. The other method available for making this distinction was by identifying the economic activities of those entrepreneurs who hired these Indians. If the contractor was a farmer or a rancher, the Indians hired by him would be more probably employed in sowing and harvesting. On the other hand, if the contractor was a cart-owner the Indians hired by him would be more probably engaged in the transportation business. Out of the data available it is possible to determine how significant was the urban and rural component of the Indian labor force. According to a detailed analysis of those contracts I found that out of those 1098 Indians hired by non-encomendero entrepreneurs in Buenos Aires, 118 Indians (10.7%) worked as urban artisan wage earners, 316 Indians (28.7%) worked as muleteers and cart-drivers, and 664 Indians (60.5%) worked as yearly laborers in farms and ranches. (See Tables 2 and 3).<sup>24</sup> However, there were farmers who apart from hiring wage earners to sow wheat and corn, they hired apprentices to run those crafts badly needed in any farm. Also, there were ranch owners who apart from hiring wage earners to run their ranches, they hire muleteers to drive their cattle to the market. Free seasonal labor in seventeenth century Buenos Aires constituted a very heterogeneous sector, hired for very specific jobs of short duration, some of them such as the branding, castration, etc. of great responsibility and specificity, and some others like cattle-hunting and rodeos of less responsibility and specificity.

This detailed study of the Buenos Aires Indian labor market have allowed us also to admit in the early seventeenth-century Buenos Aires the existence of an elastic labor market. The existence of a sudden demand for foreign merchandise caused by a deep increase in silver smuggling, combined with a chronic labor scarcity accelerated by periodic epidemics, generated a widespread competition for labor resources that finally got reflected in the wage levels. Despite the fact that competition for labor resources would have been much higher if the Portuguese entrepreneurs would not have been forbidden by the Cabildo to enter the race, and indirectly pushed them to rely exclusively on the slave market, Indian wages in seventeenth-century Buenos Aires skyrocketed.<sup>25</sup> After the epidemic that struck Buenos Aires in the early 1620's Andrés, an Indian coming from Santiago del Estero, succeeded in raising his salary from \$3 monthly in 1622 to \$3 1/2 in 1623, or a 17% increase.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, Hernando, an Indian coming also from Santiago del Estero, experienced a salary increase of 25%, from \$2 2/3 monthly in 1622 to \$3 1/3 in 1623.<sup>27</sup> Finally, Martin, an Indian from Esteco, experienced the highest increase of all, from \$2 1/2 monthly in 1622 to \$4 in 1623, or a 60% increase.<sup>28</sup> Later, when a plague struck Buenos Aires in 1652 the strongest salary inflation of the century followed. This salary inflation might have been also caused by the sudden increase in silver production in 1648 and 1649 as well as by the intense mint frauds.<sup>29</sup> For instance, Bartolo, an Indian from Corrientes, experienced a salary increase of 60%, from \$2 1/10 monthly in 1649 to \$3 1/3 in 1653.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, Pedro, an Indian from Córdoba, underwent a salary increase of 50%, from \$4 monthly in 1649 to \$6 in 1653.<sup>31</sup> A rise in money wages raised the relative prices of labor-intensive goods and lowered the relative price of land-intensive goods; its impact effect was to raise the cost of producing wheat more than that of meat and hence to lower the relative profitability of wheat production, and to stimulate the output of meat. The composition of output, therefore, swung in favor of meat, a land-intensive good. In 1621, when the epidemic struck Buenos Aires, the price of wheat increased eight times, from 8 reales each fanega (1.60 bu) in regular times to 64 reales after the epidemic, and the price of corn increased seven fold, from twelve reales to 80 reales.<sup>32</sup>

However, once in a while the colonial state, through Cabildo legislation, put a stop to salary increases coercitively ruling a *salario justo* (fair wage). During the 1630s, the average salary for agricultural workers hovered around \$30 per year. Similarly, the average salary for muleteers and cart drivers had hovered between \$3 and \$4 per month. In December 1673, the Cabildo of Buenos Aires, ordered that the Pampas Indians be paid a monthly salary of \$4 1/2, or \$54 per year at the maximum.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, when the Calchaqui Indians coming from Salta were introduced into Buenos Aires in 1680, the Cabildo reduced their salary 55%, from 4 1/2 reales to 2 reales daily.<sup>34</sup> Increased Indian

wages of a significant part of the Buenos Aires and interior tributary Indians were generated by the need to transport slaves to Chile and Upper Peru during the first half of the seventeenth century. Considering that in 1622 and 1623 39% of the Indian contracts, or 273 contracts out of 708, were signed for a total amount of \$8.190 and that in both years exports of flour and jerky amounted only to \$8.800, it would seem that the Indian labor force from the interior was mostly engaged in slave transportation services rather than in agriculture and cattle hunting.<sup>35</sup> The colonial state also got involved in discriminating who were allowed to hire Indians. Already in September 1618, governor Hernandarias decided that the Portuguese should not have the opportunity to hire Indians because of the damage this would do to local Creole and Spanish residents and conquerors.<sup>36</sup>

In order to keep a reasonable amount of laborers, Buenos Aires entrepreneurs followed a double procedure. On the one hand, by disloyally competing for the same Indians Buenos Aires entrepreneurs succeeded in guaranteeing a stable supply of manpower. The existence of a "disloyal competition" for labor means that the most prosperous entrepreneurs were able to attract Indian labor by purely economic means out of the hands of less flourishing entrepreneurs. This study allowed us also to identify the presence, in the hands of the Indians, of a certain "freedom" to choose as their masters those entrepreneurs susceptible of offering better salaries. For instance, Bartolomé, an Indian from Córdoba, who was hired in 1622 by Gonzalo Alvarez in \$25 yearly, a year later was hired by Manuel Fredes in \$30 yearly.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, Cristóbal, another Indian from Córdoba, who was hired in 1622 by Manuel Méndez in \$26 yearly, a year later was hired by Juan de la Torre in \$28 yearly.<sup>38</sup> Sebastian, an Indian from San Juan who was hired by Francisco Solís in 1623 in \$48 yearly, a year later was hired by Bartolomé Ramírez in \$50 yearly.<sup>39</sup> Baltasar, an Indian from Córdoba, who was hired by Domingo de Roma, a shoemaker, in 1642 in \$30 yearly, a year later was hired by Luis Caravallo in \$32 yearly.<sup>40</sup> Perhaps, the case where the salary increase was the highest was the one of Bartolo, an Indian from Corrientes, who was hired by Ursula Barrios in 1649 in \$25 yearly, and four years later was hired by Pedro Isarra in \$40 yearly.<sup>41</sup> Finally, the most clearcut case of abuse on the part of the entrepreneur was the one of Hernando, an Indian from San Luis, who was hired by Manuel Méndez one year after another between 1635 and 1638 in \$34, \$32, and \$33 yearly, and a year later was hired by Agustín Rodríguez de la Guerra in \$36 yearly.<sup>42</sup>

How free was the wage-labor system in seventeenth-century Buenos Aires is hard to tell. Considering that the free wage-labor system has been traditionally perceived as tied to debt-peonage arrangements, the latter should be analyzed. By instructing their overseers and foremen to supply the Indians with goods on credit and to advance them cash (debt peonage), porteño entrepreneurs assured themselves that hired tributary Indians remained in Buenos Aires after their contract had expired, a sort of extralegal compulsion to work.<sup>43</sup> Ironically, as Borah discovered in the case of Mexico, debt peonage might have helped to forge the Argentine nation.<sup>44</sup>

Debt peonage offered substantial advantages to the landowner. While avoiding the large investments needed for Negro slaves, debt peonage secured the stable supply of labor which the *encomiendas* from the interior provinces could not provide. Mayo has shown for eighteenth-century Buenos Aires, Ramírez-Horton for seventeenth-century northern Peru and del Río for northern New Spain how Indians consumed more than they could repay and in so doing became perpetually indebted to landowners and miners.<sup>45</sup> This particular situation was all the more true in Buenos Aires, where Indians were geographically segregated from their villages as well as socially divorced from their kin groups. Thus, in order to balance the lack of family support, the interior tributary Indians were usually offered advances of cloth by the non-*encomendero* employers with the understanding that they would repay this debt through amounts to be deducted from their future wages on Buenos Aires' ranches. Because Indian wage earners were chronically underpaid (with salaries ranging between \$25 and \$30 pesos yearly), it was common for Indians to borrow from their bosses and use their future earnings as collateral. Out of 29 cases of debt peonage that I found recorded among Indian notarial contracts for the

period 1602-40, 18, or 62%, were cases where the contractor was a landowner. This percentage confirms the suspicion that urban and rural debt peonage already existed in Buenos Aires from early in the seventeenth century. The average percent of indebtedness over the annual salary was thirty percent.<sup>46</sup> The highest percentage of debt over annual salary was experienced by Pedro Salinas, an Indian from Chile, who was hired in 1631 by Hernando Núñez de Guzmán, a merchant, for a salary of \$40, the former having already collected \$30, or 75% of his salary, on account of clothes and staff advanced.<sup>47</sup>

In addition to debt peonage, payment in kind help to consolidate the debt peonage system. But unlike debt peonage, payment in kind helped to divorce artisanry from agriculture. By paying with shirts and drawers, for instance, rural landowners prevented their laborers from producing their own clothes. Corroborating this trend, according to Azara, there was no domestic textile artisanry in eighteenth-century Buenos Aires countryside.<sup>48</sup> This tough divorce between both performances might have been caused among other reasons by the extreme lack of demographic balance between sexes in the rural environment. Debt peonage consisted in loaning tobacco, yerba mate, aguardiente, and clothing, such as Quito wovens, Lima's cordellate, Tucuman's wool, etc. to Indians, with the understanding that the loan represented an advance on wages; repayment could be made only through work.<sup>49</sup>

Aside from debt peonage, documents indicate that sharecropping played also a role as a pre-capitalist strategy for extracting surplus value essentially at times when farmers lack rotation funds. In 1624, Joan Bernal contracted with Amador Vázquez de Alpoim, a wealthy Portuguese landowner, to sow wheat and corn on his land for a term period of two years. Vázquez de Alpoim agreed in the contract he had signed to give Bernal a third of the crop.<sup>50</sup> In 1635, Manuel Gómez and an Indian contracted with Anonia de Maréchaga o Mansilla, wife of Diego Trujillo, to sow wheat and corn on her land.<sup>51</sup> Four years later, in 1639, Manuel Gómez, with the savings earned from this contract purchased a farm of 400 frontage varas in Conchas county for \$400.<sup>52</sup> Of course, documents do not say what happened with the Indina with whom Gómez worked out the farm. Sometimes, salary relations, debt peonage, and sharecropping appeared combined in the same contract. In 1623 Amador Vázquez de Alpoim agreed to pay Juan de la Torre one hundred pesos plus half of the crop for the service of running his ranch during a term period of one year. Moreover, Vázquez de Alpoim agreed to supply Torre with ten Indians.<sup>53</sup>

Apart from Indian labor engaged in the transportation service and in agriculture, there were quite a few Indians engaged in artisanry. But unlike the interior provinces, in Buenos Aires the competition was among master artisans for apprentices and capital and not among apprentices for masters. Likewise, the need to shift into some other means of income and thereby escape the consequences of a commercial crisis, pushed wealthy non-encomendero entrepreneurs to transfer their commercial capital from the slave trade into the domestic production. In so doing, Buenos Aires entrepreneurs indirectly succeeded in ruling the distribution of labor.

The artisan community in seventeenth century Buenos Aires was not so extended as it was in Upper Peru or Chile. However, over a population of 500 vecinos (registered residents) in 1640 only twelve were master artisans (2.5%). Similarly, over a total population of 2.500 inhabitants in 1640 only forty-two were apprentices (1.7%). Likewise, over a total Indian population of 1.050 Indians only four percent were apprentices. Few prospective Indian apprentices migrated to Buenos Aires in search of Portuguese or Spanish artisans willing to teach them a trade in exchange for their labor. After 1640, three big shoemaker masters competed in Buenos Aires over the production of boots and shoes. An activity such as shoemaking, that is, a craft which comprised a chain of simple skills, permitted a concentration of manpower. On the other hand, certain specialized services and products, such as those provided by barbers, tailors, and carpenters, required the type of skill which could not easily be broken down into the separate processes that manufacturing production such as shoemaking demands. It was

precisely those crafts which enjoyed the highest frequency in Indian artisanship.<sup>54</sup>

The most profitable artisan craft was carpentry, so long as the only artisans who could accumulate a certain amount of capital with which to purchase rural real estate were carpenters. This is not an extraordinary finding if we take into account that as an entrepot Buenos Aires always maintained a very high demand for carpenters to calk arriving ships. Those crafts whose inputs implied importation of foreign raw materials, such as tailors and blacksmiths, held fourth and fifth place in numerical importance. (see Table 4). During the 1640s, however, tailors were busy working with native cotton. In 1644, Juan Doblado de Solís purchased from Baltasar de Figueroa y Mendoza, a resident from Santiago del Estero, 180 varas of cotton linen at two pesos and six reales per yarn.<sup>55</sup> The way by which Doblado distributed this cotton is no longer known. As he did not own slaves, it is very probable that he sold the cotton to retail traders.

Although the apprentice was no longer an aspiring master of his trade but instead a permanent wage earner, in the long run he often was more expensive than Indian manpower. It is impossible to tell from the data available how significant was the Indian component of the skilled urban labor force. Out of the only five contracts that detailed the ethnic origin of Buenos Aires apprentices three were black and mulatto and only two Indians.<sup>56</sup>

However, apprenticeship did not assure stable manpower because apprentices used to run away more often than wage earners did. According to Table 3, the shoemaker Mateo Arnal possessed 12 contracted Indians and 3 apprentices; Pedro Martínez possessed 6 contracted Indians and only one apprentice; and Manuel Coello possessed 7 apprentices and only 5 contracted Indians. Recourse to different strategies in the employment of the labor force must have been conditioned by the quality and quantity of the Indian manpower and the salaries paid for it. In effect, Manuel Coello paid salaries 50 percent higher than Mateo Arnal and Pedro Martínez. In the period 1637-39, he paid his Indians an annual salary of \$60 each.<sup>57</sup> Later on, in 1648, Coello raised the salary 17 percent to \$70 yearly.<sup>58</sup> In contrast, Mateo Arnal paid only \$40 yearly.<sup>59</sup> Starting in 1643, Arnal raised the salary 62 percent to \$65 and \$70 yearly.<sup>60</sup> Meanwhile, Pedro Martínez, instead of raising salaries, diminished them. In effect, from paying \$40 yearly in 1643, he began to pay \$30 yearly in 1648.<sup>61</sup>

As Indian peasants and cart laborers, Indian apprentices did not carry last names. The latter were replaced with the names of the encomenderos to whom each Indian belonged. In our research we presumed that an apprentice and a wage earner from the same geographical origin, coming from the same encomienda, who carried the same first name, and who were hired in consecutive years by the same master artisan, were necessarily the same person. In so doing, we have been able to find only five Indian apprenticees who were later on hired by master shoemakers.<sup>62</sup>

Subsequently, we have also been able to find in the migration mechanism of Indians coming from the interior provinces the presence of common geographic origins and kinship relations as crucial elements in the selection of the entrepreneur who was going to hire them. Indians used to go wherever they could find somebody whom they knew, be him a relative or an ex-neighbour, and Buenos Aires entrepreneurs preferred to hire those Indians who either belonged to their own encomiendas, or were coming from regions with which they had commercial relations, or otherwise were relatives or friends of their own laborers. For instance, Buenos Aires encomenderos, preferred to hire those Indians who belonged to his Baradero reducción, Manuel de Avila and Domingo de Quintana hired preferably those Indians who came from their much closer Bagual encomienda. (See Table 5). According to column 5 of Table 5 Manuel de Avila hired Buenos Aires Indians 19 times higher of what should have been the case if he would have hired them without geographic distinctions.

Finally, in order to guarantee the fulfillment of the labor contract signed, sometimes the

agreement included both the duty of the entrepreneur not to fire the Indian without a reason under penalty of otherwise having to pagar de vacío (to pay the whole salary as if he had worked the entire term), and the duty of the Indian neither to absent himself nor to commit fallas (faults). But if he happened to escape the entrepreneur held the right to recover the Indian by only showing the contract.<sup>63</sup> In other words, the contract already played the role of an early sort of papeleta de conchavo (labor contract).

The ruling class also resorted to the compulsive hiring of vagrants, mozos mal entretenidos (youths badly brought up), drunks, and delinquents in order to bypass the rigidity of the labor market. By drafting or recruiting inmates and sentenced prisoners, landowners did not feel obliged to pay fixed salaries, but only a jornal (a daily wage proportional to productivity). In sum, according to Carl Solberg, the impact of vagrancy laws, some of which were not repealed until near the end of the nineteenth century, generally was to sentence the Creole rural wage earners to an informal forced serfitude at whatever wages Buenos Aires's landowners were willing to pay.<sup>64</sup>

Vagrancy and conscription laws, as stated by Richard Slatta, provided the formal mechanisms to control the gaucho and proved sufficiently useful to render other types of labor controls, such as debt peonage, less relevant in Buenos Aires.<sup>65</sup> Very likely, depression increased as the mozos mal entretenidos (or subsequently gauchos) fled to avoid forced recruitment. In February 1642, Buenos Aires' general counsel submitted a petition about vagrants who marauded the countryside and ordered, because of this evidence, "...that everybody who in their ranches, houses, and farms has some personnel should manifest it."<sup>66</sup> Similarly, Governor Pedro de Baygorri ordered in May 1653 "that all residents, inhabitants, or passengers, single and without artisanship, store or farm (even overseers) should be enlisted as soldiers within three days or otherwise leave the city for ever within fifteen days."<sup>67</sup> By preventing the gauderios (mixed races) from freely selling their manpower in the market the Governor left the rural poor at the mercy of the landowner's direct domination. This regulation prevented not only the rise of a middle class of richer peasants who might have rented the landowners's states as capitalist farmers but also the rise of a free labor force.<sup>68</sup>

Up to this point I have extensively detailed the social relations of production involved in the formation of a colonial labor force. I now want to pursue a quantitative research on the migration of a relative overpopulation to Buenos Aires.

The Buenos Aires articulating role did not exert an exclusive claim to the three migration branches mentioned before because those three geographic areas (north, east, and west) also served as private pools of labor for Upper Peru, the Jesuit Missions, Sao Paulo, and Chile. The northwest area was the main cockpit of struggle between the claims of Upper Peruvian and Buenos Aires entrepreneurs for labor. The farther to the north the province, the heavier the role of the Buenos Aires labor demand.<sup>69</sup> Scrutinizing seven northern cities from which a high Indian population had been extracted by Buenos Aires' entrepreneurs allows one to prove the previous point. Percentages will weigh the relative importance of the Indian population in each province extracted by Buenos Aires upon the total Indian population that migrated to Buenos Aires. They will also reveal the relative importance of these migration currents upon the total Indian population of each one of those provinces. Table 1 verifies the importance of the Buenos Aires labor demand upon each one of the northern provinces, listed from north to south. Likewise, considering over the total Indian population of each province, Table 1 shows us the same point.

In addition to measuring Indian migration by province, one can measure the same variable by encomienda. This shows that the individual rates by encomienda are much higher than those by province. Despite the fact that Santiago del Estero, contributed to Buenos Aires more absolute Indian manpower than Córdoba, if one considers the relative burden that Buenos Aires' labor demand had on

the encomiendas of both provinces, one must conclude that Buenos Aires extracted a much higher percentage of Indians from Córdoba's encomiendas than from Santiago del Estero, La Rioja, Esteco, or Tucumán's encomiendas. In effect, according to Table 1, Esteco and Concepción del Bermejo encomiendas experienced an average labor drainage towards Buenos Aires of around 7 percent. Santiago del Estero's encomiendas underwent an average drainage of 33 percent. Tucumán's encomiendas experienced an average extraction of 17 percent. Finally, Córdoba's encomiendas underwent an average drainage of 26 percent. In Esteco and Concepción del Bermejo, only ten encomiendas out of a total of 66, or 15 percent, exchanged Indians with Buenos Aires. Similarly, in Santiago del Estero, 12 encomiendas out of 42, or 29 percent, shipped Indians to Buenos Aires. Regarding Córdoba, sixteen encomiendas out of a total of 29, or 55 percent, sent Indians to Buenos Aires. The encomienda of Quilino, managed by Pedro Luis de Cabrera dispatched three Indians out of a total population of nine elder Indians, or 33 percent. The encomienda of Soto, administered by Luis de Tejeda, transported to Buenos Aires three Indians out of a total population of 16 older Indians, or 19 percent. The encomienda of Hernando de Texeda sent five Indians out of a total of ten Indians, or 50 percent.<sup>70</sup>

The western region (Chile, Mendoza, San Juan, and San Luis) also experienced a long history of forced economic migration. Late in the sixteenth century and early in the seventeenth century, Huarpe Indians in the Cuyo region, on the east side of the Andes, experienced the results of a tug-of-war between the labor demands of Chile, Tucumán, and Buenos Aires.<sup>71</sup> Such was the need for labor that some Cuyano encomenderos profited from renting out their Indians to non-encomendero entrepreneurs in both Chile and Buenos Aires. For example, in 1603 and 1607, Alvaro de Gelves, an encomendero from Mendoza, rented out to a Chilean entrepreneur nine Indians.<sup>72</sup> In the 1620's, Gelves, due to higher prices, preferred to rent his Indians to Buenos Aires.<sup>73</sup> In the 1620s and 1630s, entrepreneurs in Buenos Aires replaced those in Chile and Tucumán as the main contractors of labor in the Cuyo region and even began to demand Chilean labor itself. Population figures with respect to the total amount of Indians that migrated to Buenos Aires from the western provinces underscore this shift. We find that Chile was responsible for the out-migration of 57 Indians over a total of 104, or 55 percent. Mendoza accounted for 30 Indians, or 29 percent; San Juan contributed 9 Indians, or 9 percent; San Luis provided 8 Indians, or 8 percent (see Table 1).

The litoral branch, including Santa Fé, Corrientes, Concepción del Bermejo, and Paraguay, also experienced a long history of forced depopulation, or village decomposition. In 1595, the Cabildo of Santa Fé addressed letters to the governors of Tucumán and the Rio de la Plata, Pedro de Mercado and Fernando de Zárate, informing them how residents from Santiago del Estero had crossed the city limits of Santa Fé in order to take Indians from their repartimientos.<sup>74</sup> In the seventeenth century, and in a way similar to the other branches, the litoral region was caught between the labor demands of the Jesuit Missions, Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires. Concepción del Bermejo, in particular, was caught between the labor demands of Tucumán and Santa Fé.<sup>75</sup> The closer to Paraguay the region under consideration, the greater the importance of the Jesuit and Brazilian demand and the less the role of Buenos Aires. Contrariwise, the closer to the south the area, the heavier the role of Buenos Aires. This can be ascertained by analyzing the figures with respect to the total number of Indians who migrated to Buenos Aires from the litoral provinces. Paraguay was responsible for the out-migration of 121 Indians of a total of 179 Indians who moved, or 68 percent. Of the remainder, Santa Fé supplied 30 Indians, or 21 percent, and Corrientes accounted for 16 Indians, or 9 percent. But if one analyzes the absolute figures in relation to the total Indian population of each province, one discovers that Paraguay exported 121 Indians out of an Indian population of 3,783, or 3 percent, and Corrientes exported 16 Indians out of an Indian population of 438, or 4 percent. Yet Santa Fé's province, the closest to Buenos Aires, exported 38 Indians out of a total of 95 or 40 percent (see Table 1).

The Paraguayan encomiendas had been slowly depopulated by means of yerba mate

entrepreneurs, Jesuit missionaries, Paulista bandeirantes, and shipowners engaged in Parana river transportation.<sup>76</sup> Apparently, according to the following figures, the latter provided the weakest labor demand of all four.<sup>77</sup> For instance, the single encomienda of Gabriel de Vera y Aragón with 131 Indians: eight encomiendas of Francisco Sánchez de Vera located in Yaguarón, Caazapá, and Guarambaré, composed of 96 Indians; and the one encomienda of Juan de Medina de Ocampo, located in Itá, composed of 21 Indians, dispatched to Buenos Aires only two Indians each. Likewise, Dxomingo Berdejo de Rojas' two encomiendas, located in Asunción and Tobatí, composed of 24 Indians; Francisco de Espíndola's encomienda, located in San Ignacio, composed of 22 Indians; and Luis de Encina's two encomiendas, located in Ipané, composed of 13 Indians, supplied Buenos Aires with only one Indian each.<sup>78</sup>

However, not all Indians in Buenos Aires came from the interior. As previously stated, rural Indian peonage did not originate only in the interior provinces, Indians employed in agriculture, public works, building of churches, and cattle hunting were mainly from refugee zones (Indian reducciones) established around Buenos Aires (the Baradero, Bagual, and Tubichaminí settlements, according to Góngora's census of 1621, revealed 668 Indians).<sup>79</sup>

According to Murdo Mac Leod, Indians close to a Spanish city, a royal highway, or a port "became ladino" more rapidly than others.<sup>80</sup> Consequently, the closer to the Paraná and Plata rivers the encomiendas, the greater the possibility for an encomendero to rent out his Indians. Instead, the farther to the south the encomienda, the more hard for the entitled encomendero to hire out his Indians. Using figures provided by Ravnigani and those collected by myself, I have been able to calculate approximately the relative weight of Indian contracts on those encomiendas located close to the Paraná and La Plata rivers. Only a small percentage of local Indians were hired by non-encomendero entrepreneurs on a wage basis. Records establish that 5 Chaná Indians (Baradero reservations) out of 40 (12 percent), 4 Caguané Indians (Bagual reservation) out of 33 (12 percent), and 3 Tubuchaminí Indians (Magdalena reservation) out of 48 (4 percent) were hired by non-encomenderos.<sup>81</sup> None of the Serrano, Lagunero, and Vilachichís Indians located far to the south, but also distributed in encomiendas appeared in the notarial records as contracted wage earners.

The majority of the contractors of those Indians were whole-salers and merchants from the interior provinces, followed in order of importance by landowners, cartowners, cattle foremen and finally master artisans. Of 393 Indian contractors, only 104, or approximately one-quarter, invested in urban or rural land in Buenos Aires. The remaining three-fourths were merchants from the interior provinces who rented their homes while doing business in Buenos Aires (from Data Bank). Thus, we finally find that Buenos Aires Indian labor demand was mainly carried through by interior merchants who traded in Buenos Aires. By giving priority to the transportation and storage services, Buenos Aires' contractors of Indians stimulated local urban artisanry, through apprenticeship and Indian artisan contracts. Because of the scarcity of European artisans, 102 Indian artisan contracts and 22 apprenticeship contracts were negotiated in Buenos Aires in the period 1614-48.<sup>82</sup>

The problem of Indian migration from the provinces or the villages inside the provincial limits of Paraguay began in the 1590's with the first settlement of the frontier. Juan Ramírez de Velazco's Ordinances (1597) recorded that Presidents, soldiers and merchants engaged in forced migration of Indians to other places should be obliged to keep records as well as collateral for its restitution.<sup>83</sup> By pleading village poverty, the payment of legal bail for the return of the Indians recruited from their villages for the yerba mate harvest was usually evaded. Paraguayan governors took counter-measures to offset the Indian exodus that resulted from the yerba trade. Cart fleets for example, were obliged to register day laborers and to deposit the collateral for the return of these laborers. This last stipulation conformed to the fact that a great number of Indians in the provinces of Tucuman and Paraguay ran away, leaving wives and undermining the social structure that the church was trying to preserve.<sup>84</sup>

The reason for running away from the encomiendas obeyed essentially to the sad nature of the work and the low payment Indians received. Work was worse in the interior encomiendas than in Buenos Aires because the work at Paraguayan yerbales or Tucumán's obrajes de paño was extremely arduous and demanding. To send the Indians to work in the yerbales was to give them almost a death sentence. Instead, wheat husbandry in Buenos Aires was much less labor-intensive than yerba in Paraguay or paño in Tucumán. In other words, the work of preparing the soil, sowing, harvesting, and processing the crop was much more evenly spread out through the year, than yerbas or paño. Compared to the work in the transportation (oxen-carts) business or in Buenos Aires farms, the workers of the interior encomiendas were much worse off. Indian workers in Buenos Aires were paid \$2 for the month's work, which was better salary than Indians received at Tucumán's obrajes or at Paraguay's yerbales, especially taking into account the abundance and cheapness of foodstuffs in Buenos Aires compared with the austerity of Tucumán or Paraguay. In Buenos Aires one peso would buy almost a cow or 150 pounds of jerked beef while in Tucumán or Paraguay a peso bought much less.

Where did these Indians finally go? Did they simply die as a result of the several epidemics that struck Buenos Aires, or did they return to their homelands in the interior provinces? Although there is a good deal to suggest that both possibilities were the case, I have been unable to find out the exact reason why in the middle of the seventeenth century notarial contracts between Buenos Aires non-encomenderos entrepreneurs and Indians from the northern provinces suddenly came to an end. Assadourian told me in a private conversation that it might be very well possible that the Indian migration coming from the northern provinces continued going on but that the legal requisite that each Indian hired be registered at the notary, as was imposed by the Alfaro's regulations, was simply informally removed. This last interpretation might very well be true considering that Philip IV, due to deep treasury needs caused by the international warfare of that period, published in 1640 a royal pragmatic which imposed upon every contract the obligation to use sealed paper.<sup>85</sup>

Personally, however, I feel that the main reason why the registration of these notarial contracts came to an end was due to the fact that those Indians or their non-encomendero employers simply stopped paying tribute to their original encomenderos, thus changing their status from mitayos to yanaconas, or simply returning to their original encomiendas or villages.

Indians from the interior provinces usually came to Buenos Aires leaving their women and children in their encomiendas of origin. Such was the amount of single Indians immigrated in 1610 that the Buenos Aires Cabildo was afraid those Indians might commit bigamy with local Indians.<sup>86</sup> The Buenos Aires contractor who benefited from them imposed the costs of both maintenance and reproduction on the indigenous communities, covering with the wages paid to the worker only the reconstitution of the immediate labor power.<sup>87</sup>

Therefore, according to Enrique Tandeter, "...Indian labor was a means through which the Indian communities transfer value into the sphere of production where draft labour was applied".<sup>88</sup>

Accordingly, as we learn from Alejandro Portes, the cheap cost of labor in economies that maintain a traditional subsistence sector comes, not only from the exploitation of the labor of the wage earner but also of the labor of his kin group, which in turn preserves the viability of the subsistence economy.<sup>89</sup>

Considering that most of those Indians who came to Buenos Aires to work for a salary left their women and children in their encomiendas of origin and that many of them might have committed bigamy one wonders what would have happened to them once they returned to their homeland. My personal guess is that those Indians lost their condition of originarios and became a sort of forastero Indian. Those Indians who became forasteros were forced to register so that they would provide mita

labor and pay tribute.<sup>90</sup> In being forced to register these migrant Indians became extremely susceptible to insurrect. Thus, I presume that the widespread rebellions that broke out in the 1630s and 1640s up in the Tucumán province were led by those forastero Indians who learnt while working in Buenos Aires other Indian dialects, and who experienced in their economic lives sharp contrasts, such as having been involved in sharecropping and wage labor.<sup>91</sup> By having experienced a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications in the Buenos Aires area, followed by a sharp reversal in their homeland, forastero Indians felt inclined to rebel as soon as they realized the widening of the gap between expectations and gratifications.<sup>92</sup>

However, this was not the case of those Indians born in the Buenos Aires region and who belonged to the few reducciones established in its surroundings. The closer the reducción to a Spanish city, a royal highway, or a port, the more easy became its acculturation process.<sup>93</sup> Thus, this is why the Indians from the Baradero reducción did not run away as often as those Indians from the reducciones of Bagual and Tubichaminí. None of the latter, despite their residential segregation, had a stable demographic history, because most of their Indians ran away as soon as tributes or diseases jeopardized their communal life. For instance, in the case of the Baagual reducción their Indians escaped twice in almost a decade. First in 1609 and second in 1620 the Bagual Indians were recovered by means of military and religious strategies.<sup>94</sup> And considering that the caciques of both the Bagual and Tubichaminí Indians were related each other one may very well think that each time the Bagual Indians ran away the Tubichaminí followed their example.<sup>95</sup>

In summary, I have shown that in the Buenos Aires process of incorporation into world trade encomenderos from the interior provinces allied themselves with Buenos Aires merchants and landowners accelerating thereby the process of formation of a colonial labor force, as well as the articulation of Buenos Aires with its own hinterland. The gradual removal of tribute obligations to interior encomenderos might have been the main economic factor in attracting the Indian labor from the interior provinces. By not having to pay taxes and/or tributes in their new settlement, Indians from the interior provinces, who had not been accustomed to earning salaries, regarded Buenos Aires as a very attractive place to migrate.

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> Alvarez, 1914; and Levene, 1927, quoted by Mayo, 1984, 609.

<sup>2</sup> Mariátegui, 1943; and Bagú, 1949, 126. On Bagú's thesis, see Córdova, 1972, 267-284. On the way Mariátegui borrowed his thesis from Sombart through Gobetti and Croce, see Chiaramonte, 1984, 74. In this same line of thought, see Córdova, 1983, 297.

<sup>3</sup> Susnik, 1965.

<sup>4</sup> Río, 1977.

<sup>5</sup> Wolf, 1972.

<sup>6</sup> van Young, 1981; Mörner, 1973, 183-216; and Bauer, 1979, 49.

<sup>7</sup> Martínez Pelaez, 1975, 460.

<sup>8</sup> Jara, 1965.

<sup>9</sup> Mac Leod, 1973, 296.

<sup>10</sup> Río, 1977.

<sup>11</sup> García, 1948, 249-287.

<sup>12</sup> Peña, 1973, 49; and Frank, 1979.

<sup>13</sup> Katz, 1974, 7; Kay, 1976, 81-88; and Bauer, 1979, 34-63. For a further study on this topic, see Chiaramonte, 1984, 236-237.

<sup>14</sup> Asadourian, 1979; Tandeter, 1979; Assadourian, 1983, 281; Meillasoux, 1972, 102; and Martínez-Alier, 1977, 13; and Garavaglia, 1983, 303.

<sup>15</sup> García Soriano, 1969, 109-129; Balán, 1976, 201-235; and Guy, 1978, 135-145. See also Bock and Iutaka, 1969; and Muñoz, et. al., 1974.

<sup>16</sup> Molina, 1948, 117-118; Cervera, 1907, 352; Acuerdos, Municip., III, 192; Peña, 1916, 9, 12, and 44; Acuerdos, AGN, t.IX, 283, 473, 503, and t. XI, 172; and Garretón, 1933, chapters IX and X.

<sup>17</sup> About Mayordomos de Encomienda, ver Mayo, 1978, 27-59.

<sup>18</sup> The real population rates out of which the following arguments were elaborated were much lower than the rates shown here. In effect, these rates were calculated from Indian migration figures that correspond to the first half of the seventeenth century (see Table 1) and from census figures, for each encomienda, which were collected in 1672. The fact that this last census was conducted after a general epidemic and that the repression of the Calchaquí's Rebellion had decimated the Indian population shows that the denominator of those rates was lower than in the first half of the century. But if one keeps in mind that the purpose of this last census was to convince the Spanish king of the extreme depopulation of the area and the consequent need for African slave labor, then the voluntary underestimation of the Indian population that follows undermines the reliability of this census even more, and indirectly inflates those rates. See Ravignani, 1932, 287ff.

<sup>19</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 82, 527.

<sup>20</sup> Solveyra, 1974a, 213-238; and Solveyra, 1974b, 24.

<sup>21</sup> Mellafe Rojas, 1968, 310.

<sup>22</sup> see Urbano Salerno, 1973, 869-891.

<sup>23</sup> Acuerdos, Municip., VII, 50.

<sup>24</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 65, 502.

<sup>25</sup> Acuerdos, III, 426.

<sup>26</sup> AGN, v.11, f.183; and v.12, f.95.

<sup>27</sup> AGN, v.11, f.241; and v.12, f.366.

<sup>28</sup> AGN, v.11, f.569; and v.12, f.85.

<sup>29</sup> see Assadourian, 1983, 51.

<sup>30</sup> AGN, v.1, f.685; and v.32, f.447.

<sup>31</sup> AGN, v.1, f.679; and v.32, f.422v.

<sup>32</sup> Correspondencia de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, t.II, 172.

<sup>33</sup> Acuerdos, AGN, XIV, 62.

<sup>34</sup> Acuerdos, AGN, XV, 343-396.

<sup>35</sup> Already in 1602, in Córdoba, 19 licenses were requested by Spaniards to conduct 29 Indians of different encomiendas to Buenos Aires to serve in the cart business. In all cases, the number of Indians did not exceed 20 each time. The total generally consisted of Indians rented out to non-encomenderos (Solveyra, 1974).

<sup>36</sup> Acuerdos, Municip., III, 426.

<sup>37</sup> AGN, v.11, f.538; and v.12, f.320.

<sup>38</sup> AGN, v.11, f.147; and v.12, f.147v.

<sup>39</sup> AGN, v.12, f.47; v.13, f.65.

<sup>40</sup> AGN, v.26, f.516v.; and v.27, f.109v.

<sup>41</sup> AGN, v.1, f.685; and v.32, f.447.

<sup>42</sup> AGN, v.21, f.435v.; v.23, f.230v.; v.24, f.523; and v.25, f.244.

<sup>43</sup> About a similar process occurred in eighteenth-century Buenos Aires countryside, see Halperín Donghi, 1975, 457-458, quoted in Mayo, 1984, 615.

<sup>44</sup> Borah, 1949, 42.

<sup>45</sup> Mayo, 1984, 612-615; and Ramírez-Horton, 1977, 315.

<sup>46</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 84, 530.

<sup>47</sup> AGN, v.17, f.747v.

<sup>48</sup> Azara, 1949, 9; quoted by Mayo, 1984, 615.

<sup>49</sup> Sagueir, 1982, Tabla 85, p.532.

<sup>50</sup> AGN, v.13, f.135v.

<sup>51</sup> AGN, v.21, f.208.

<sup>52</sup> AGN, v.24, f.54.

<sup>53</sup> AGN, v.12, f.101.

<sup>54</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 90, p.541.

- <sup>55</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 90, 541.
- <sup>56</sup> AGN, v.27, f.563.
- <sup>57</sup> AGN, v.23, f.289v.; and v.24, f.27 and 178.
- <sup>58</sup> AGN, v.1, f.676v.
- <sup>59</sup> AGN, v.24, f.15, 57, 59, 174, and 265.
- <sup>60</sup> AGN, v.27, f.234 and 235.
- <sup>61</sup> AGN, v.27, f.75; and v.1, f.659.
- <sup>62</sup> AGN, v.22, f.446v., and v.24, f.121; v.22, f.340v.; and v.26, f.702v.; v.26, f.445; and v.27, f.75; v.23, f.349v.; and v.24, f.178; v.24, f.6v., and v.24, f.119.
- <sup>63</sup> AGN, v.25, f.187, and v.1, f.674.
- <sup>64</sup> Solberg, 1974, 127.
- <sup>65</sup> Slatta, 1980, 453.
- <sup>66</sup> Rodríguez Molas, 1968, 114.
- <sup>67</sup> Rodríguez Molas, 1968, 115.
- <sup>68</sup> Brenner, 1977.
- <sup>69</sup> In 1586, Governor Juan Ramírez de Velazco wrote to the king that in the previous four years more than 4,000 Indians had been sent from Tucuman to Charcas. See Levillier, 1920, 143-144; and Zorraquín Becú, 1965, 317-324.
- <sup>70</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 83, 528.
- <sup>71</sup> Jara, 1956, 184; and Jara, 1965, 52.
- <sup>72</sup> Jara, 1956, 198.
- <sup>73</sup> AGN, v.11, f.264; and v.12, f.66.
- <sup>74</sup> Actas del Cabildo de la Ciudad de Santa Fé, t. II, 1944, 194.
- <sup>75</sup> Cervera, 1909, 266 and 290; and Torre Revello, 1943, 151, 160 and 171.
- <sup>76</sup> Maeder, 1974.
- <sup>77</sup> Ravignani, 1932.
- <sup>78</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 83, 528.
- <sup>79</sup> Zinny, 1920-21, v.I, 109; and Torre Revello, 1944, 13; Torre Revello, 1958, 229-240; Marfany, 1940, 33 and 36; and Molina, 1948, 265-271.

- <sup>80</sup> Mac Leod, 1979, 80.
- <sup>81</sup> Data Bank
- <sup>82</sup> Saguier, 1982, Table 65, 502.
- <sup>83</sup> Susnik, 1965, 125; and Mora Mérida, 1973, 145-150.
- <sup>84</sup> Susnik, 1965, 135; and Rípodas Ardanaz, 1977, 370-378.
- <sup>85</sup> Esquivel y Navia, 1980, II, 75.
- <sup>86</sup> Acuerdos, Municip., II, 137.
- <sup>87</sup> Tandeter, 1980.
- <sup>88</sup> Tandeter, 1980.
- <sup>89</sup> Portes, 1978, 14.
- <sup>90</sup> Orlove, 1976, 136.
- <sup>91</sup> Sierra, 1957, II, cap.VI, 260-280; and Montes, 1959, 81-159.
- <sup>92</sup> Davies, 1969, 671.
- <sup>93</sup> MacLeod, 1979, 80.
- <sup>94</sup> Bruno, 1967, II, 190 and 204.
- <sup>95</sup> Bruno, 1967, II, 195.